Hybrid regimes prove more vulnerable to sanctions than autocracies
A new Banque de France working paper analyzes 309 sanctions episodes from 1990 to 2018 and finds that hybrid regimes are significantly more vulnerable to external pressure than closed autocracies. The study reveals that foreign aid suspensions are at least as effective as traditional economic sanctions in compelling policy compliance.
Democratic traits create sanction leverage
Analyzing an original dataset of 309 sanctions episodes between 1990 and 2018, researchers Clara Portela and Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti examine how regime structures influence compliance.
Hybrid regimes—combining competitive multiparty elections with autocratic governance—comprise 65 percent of target countries in the sample.
Regression results demonstrate a statistically significant increase in sanctions vulnerability as political openness grows.
However, this relationship breaks down upon crossing into fully closed autocracies.
Single-party regimes remain highly resilient, whereas other hybrid structures succumb more readily to external economic pressure.
Aid cuts bypass wealth defenses
The paper highlights foreign aid suspensions as an unusually potent policy tool compared to trade bans.
Higher economic prosperity typically shields target nations from traditional sanctions by allowing trade redirection and sanction-busting.
In contrast, aid suspensions cannot easily be offset because alternative donors are rarely available.
Consequently, target wealth reduces the impact of economic sanctions but fails to weaken the effectiveness of foreign aid withdrawals on hybrid regimes.
A tactical edge for Western donors
The paper provides a clear blueprint for Western donors seeking effective leverage without commercial fallout.
However, it understates the risk that aid suspensions might force hybrid regimes into alternative non-Western alliances.
Still, recognizing regime hybridity is a crucial upgrade for targeted coercive diplomacy.
Source: Aid Sanctions and Hybrid Regimes
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