Cryptographic tools balance payment privacy and auditability
BDI Paper

Cryptographic tools balance payment privacy and auditability

A Banca d'Italia study maps how privacy-enhancing technologies reconcile user confidentiality with regulatory oversight in digital payment infrastructures. The authors analyze cryptographic trade-offs across decentralized and centrally managed payment architectures.

Cryptographic tools enable selective disclosure

The study analyzes cryptographic primitives across account-based and token-based payment architectures.

Zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic commitments allow systems to verify transaction constraints and account balances without exposing underlying data.

Blind and randomizable signatures break links between issuance and spending, while ring signatures hide senders within decoy sets.

To satisfy anti-money laundering rules, the authors examine five auditability mechanisms: anonymity budgets that cap unmonitored transfers, operating limits verified in zero-knowledge, revocable anonymity via threshold encryption trapdoors, coin tracing, and policy verification without disclosure.

Three generations from e-cash to compliance

The evolution of private digital payments spans three generations: early centralized e-cash, decentralized crypto-assets like Bitcoin and Monero, and third-generation designs integrating compliance.

The paper shows that privacy guarantees depend on system-level architecture rather than isolated cryptographic tools.

Operational metadata, network timing, and address reuse can erode anonymity even when mathematical proofs hold.

Furthermore, advanced zero-knowledge proof systems introduce engineering trade-offs between proof size, proving overhead, and trusted setups.

A governance choice disguised as cryptography

The paper dismantles the false dichotomy between total user anonymity and unchecked state surveillance.

Cryptographic selective disclosure offers a viable middle ground, yet technical tools cannot replace transparent institutional governance.

Central banks must recognize that privacy by design requires political choices before code deployment.

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