Central bank authority requires durable societal consent
BIS Speech

Central bank authority requires durable societal consent

Independent central banks derive their authority from broader societal arrangements rather than purely technical mandates, according to a Bank for International Settlements address. The speech examines historical roots dating back to 1780.

From Hamilton to modern mandates

The speech traces the concept of central bank authority back to September 3, 1780, when Alexander Hamilton observed that “the Bank of England unites public authority and faith with private credit.”

Drawing on economic historian Douglass North, institutions are defined as the humanly devised rules and constraints that shape collective interaction.

Central bank independence extends beyond technical frameworks for monetary policy or financial stability into the fundamental relationship between public institutions and the societies they serve.

These institutional structures operate as durable social arrangements designed to resolve collective challenges, establish how authority is exercised, and safeguard public interests.

Steering borrowing, jobs and stability

Independent central banks rank among the most distinctive creations of modern societies, exercising powers that directly shape macroeconomic outcomes.

Their policy decisions determine borrowing costs, saving choices, employment prospects, investment plans, and systemic financial stability.

Because these decisions carry significant economic consequences for households and businesses, the scope and exercise of central bank authority remain under continuous public debate and institutional scrutiny.

Legitimacy beyond the balance sheet

Central bankers rightly acknowledge that technical competence alone cannot protect their autonomy from political scrutiny.

Yet grounding independence in historical philosophy fails to address immediate public concerns regarding wider mandates.

Measurable policy outcomes matter far more than abstract institutional theory.

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