Backloaded rate increases curb speculative boom risks
Phasing in monetary tightening during speculative booms mitigates subsequent recessions in a model by Jonathan Goldberg and David López-Salido. Front-loaded tightening instead damages leveraged investors' wealth and can deepen downturns.
Tighten later to protect balance sheets
Goldberg of the Federal Reserve Board and López-Salido of the Bank of Spain model investors whose differing asset valuations fuel leveraged speculation.
An immediate policy-induced asset-price decline reduces optimistic investors' wealth share, weakening demand and worsening subsequent recessions.
Optimal policy avoids that initial loss by postponing rate increases and allowing asset prices to decline gradually.
In the benchmark, the policy rate temporarily falls while expected future rates rise, steepening the yield curve.
Lower boom-time valuations then soften losses when the bust arrives.
The gains involve costs: output falls below potential during the boom and optimistic investors accumulate wealth more slowly.
The results apply to low-interest-rate environments.
Expectations transmit costs across cycles
The calibration uses U.S. data for 1952–2023, with average expansions of five years, recessions of one year, a 4 percent discount rate and a leverage limit of 4.3. A binding zero lower bound prevents full demand stabilization in recessions.
Across cycles, anticipated asset-price caps in future booms depress risky-asset demand during recessions; phased-in optimal policy mitigates this channel.
In an extension, reduced bust risk permits near-term rate increases, but that risk reduction is assumed rather than established.
Timing is not a universal prescription
The paper makes policy timing central to its case for restraining speculation, rather than endorsing immediate tightening.
Its scope remains conditional on low rates and the model's financial structure.
The authors do not solve optimal policy with mixed boom types, and their systematic-policy results use two-cycle economies.