Low term premia push bank maturity gap to 5.7 years
BIS Paper

Low term premia push bank maturity gap to 5.7 years

A San Francisco Fed working paper shows U.S. bank maturity mismatch more than tripled since the mid-1980s to 5.7 years in 2022. Researchers find that declining term premia and compressed interest rates force less profitable banks to extend asset duration to cover operating expenses.

From 1.6 to 5.7 years

Historical Call Report data reveals that the maturity gap of U.S. commercial banks expanded from a trough of 1.6 years in 1986 to a peak of 5.7 years in late 2022.

Authors Thomas Mertens, Pascal Paul, and Andres Schneider demonstrate that this trend tracks declining short-term interest rates and term premia.

To cover operating costs averaging 2.5 percent of total assets, banks face an implicit profitability constraint.

When compressed yields reduce baseline interest margins, institutions extend asset duration toward higher-yielding long-term bonds to meet earnings targets.

Cross-sectional evidence confirms that banks with lower return on assets subsequently increase asset maturities, primarily within their securities portfolios, to rebuild net interest margins.

The quantitative easing paradox

Quantitative easing aims to remove duration risk from the private sector by replacing long-term securities with zero-maturity central bank reserves.

However, the model shows that compressing term premia below a critical threshold forces banks to take on more duration risk to stay solvent.

Quantitative analysis indicates that falling short-term rates account for 55 percent of the four-year maturity gap rise, while term premium compression drives the remaining 45 percent.

This duration loading leaves banks vulnerable to self-fulfilling deposit runs if interest rates suddenly surge.

A dangerous policy side effect

The paper highlights a structural conflict between central bank policy and bank stability.

By suppressing term premia, quantitative easing inadvertently forces profit-starved banks into dangerous duration risk.

Regulators must recognize how prolonged rate suppression incentivizes severe balance sheet mismatches.

Source: Reaching for Duration

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