Quantum-risk practices put cryptographic migration on boards' agenda
Financial firms can use voluntary quantum-risk practices from the Prudential Regulation Authority, Financial Conduct Authority and Bank of England. The guidance covers cryptographic inventories, migration plans and supplier dependencies.
Map dependencies before migrating
The practices cover firms and financial market infrastructures proportionately to their size, complexity and risk profile.
Boards can set strategy, assign responsibility, fund migration and agree milestones.
Firms can inventory cryptographic assets and supplier dependencies, then prioritise sensitive data, critical services and legacy systems.
No cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is known to exist, but attackers can harvest encrypted data for later decryption.
Migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) involves phased implementation, testing, safe reversal and recovery planning.
Crypto-agility enables algorithm replacement as threats evolve.
Firms remain accountable for outsourced services and can coordinate migration with suppliers and counterparties.
Voluntary practices, uncertain timelines
The practices are separate from formal supervisory expectations; draft cyber guidance is under consultation through CP17/26. Inputs include HM Treasury, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), international bodies and industry.
A 2025 expert survey by Global Risk Institute and Evolution Inc, cited in a March 2026 executive summary, puts probable CRQC development within 15 years, with a meaningful probability within 10 years.
Following NCSC guidance, hybrid classical/PQC arrangements are an interim measure toward PQC-only systems.
Migration is not the endpoint
The regulators frame quantum resilience as continuing risk management, not a one-off technology replacement.
Supplier readiness and incompatible timelines affect firms' own exposure.
Maintaining inventories, testing controls and revising plans remain necessary as threats and standards evolve.